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Abstract. We introduce asymmetric information about consumers' transportation costs
(i.e., the degree of product dierentiation) in the model of Hotelling (1929). When the
transportation costs are high, both rms have lower prots than in the case of perfect
information. Contrarily, both rms may prefer the asymmetric information case if the
transportation costs are low (the informed rm always prefers the informational advantage,
while the uninformed rm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information
sharing is ex-ante advantageous for the rms, but ex-post damaging in the case of low
transportation costs. If the information is not veriable, the informed rm always tends
to announce that the transportation cost is high. To induce truthful revelation: (i) the
uninformed rm must pay for the informed rm to confess that the transportation costs
are low; and (ii) the informed rm must make a payment (to the uninformed rm or to a
third party) for the uninformed rm to believe that the transportation costs are high.
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11 Introduction
When investing in a foreign market, rms usually have less information than the com-
petitors operating in their home market. Jiang and Yoneyama (2008) present China as a
country where this phenomenon is very common. To be competitive in the market, the
foreign rms and the Chinese rms must gather information about demand. The authors
argue, however, that the local rms acquire the information at a lower cost than their
foreign counterparts.
Based on the work of Hotelling (1929), we model a duopoly in which rms sell hori-
zontally dierentiated products. One rm sells the product in her home market while the
other is foreign. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the information available to each
rm is not the same. More precisely, we assume that only the domestic rm completely
knows the consumers' transportation costs. The rm operating abroad is uncertain about
the magnitude of the transportation costs.
From a geographical viewpoint, the transportation costs result from costly travels: the
farther is a store from the consumer, the more costly is the product for him. Consumers can
support high (physical) transportation costs due to many reasons, namely bad conditions in
roadways, expensive fuel or lack of public transports.3 In a preference-based interpretation
of the model, the magnitude of the transportation costs is closely related to the degree
of product dierentiation. The transportation cost is the disutility that results from the
purchase of a variety that is dierent from the consumer's favorite.
We assume exogenous locations of rms and put the emphasis of the analysis on price
setting. This assumption is reasonable, for example, when a rm signs a contract with
the customers, committing herself to maintain the price for a considerable period of time.
In this case, a mistake in the price setting can imply serious losses for the rm. In the
literature, however, the uncertainty about demand is usually assumed to aect only the
rms' locations. The main arguments sustaining such assumption are the high reallocation
costs and the 
exibility of prices. Even if a rm sets a non optimal price, she is considered
3Lal and Matutes (1989) provide an additional justication for dierences in transportation costs. They
consider that some of the consumers are rich while the remainder are poor. The poor do not support an
\opportunity cost for a shopping trip". On the contrary, the rich customers support a positive \cost of
time". Following this interpretation, dierences in transportation costs can also be thought as resulting
from dierences in consumers' wealth.
2to be able to correct it in the following period. Casado-Izaga (2000), for example, assumes
that rms learn about consumers' real tastes before setting prices.
When the transportation costs are high (low), the domestic rm is aware that charging
a higher price has a low (high) eect on her demand. As a result, the domestic rm will
set a high (low) price. The foreign rm, being uncertain about the transportation costs,
sets an average price. If the transportation costs turn out to be high (low), the foreign
rm captures more (less) than half of the market. We nd that to be more informed about
the market's characteristics is not always synonym of obtaining a higher prot. When
consumers incur in high transportation costs, the foreign rm can actually obtain higher
prots than the rival. In this case, to charge a lower price is compensated by a higher
demand.
We compare the situation of asymmetric information to the case in which both rms
have full information. When the transportation costs are high, each rm obtains more
prots in the scenario of symmetric information. When these costs are low, both rms
charge a higher price in the presence of asymmetric information than they would in the
case of common knowledge. In this case, asymmetric information enables the domestic rm
to prot more. When the transportation costs are low, the foreign rm typically benets
from being uninformed.
The foreign rm is interested in acquiring information about the transportation costs,
because this increases her expected prot. This information could be obtained through
a market research or from an agency responsible for attracting foreign investments. But
sometimes market researches are so expensive that discourage rms to carry them on.
And the data possessed by the foreign investment agency may not be suciently accurate
(since these agencies usually gather information from several sectors of the economy).
Some aspects, like consumers' preferences, are only learned by experimenting the market.
Therefore, the domestic rm can be a good source of such kind of information. Liu and
Serfes (2006) present the \databases with detailed records of consumers' preferences" as a
typical example of information that a rm sells to another.4 Unless issues related to the
protection of consumers' privacy, this exchange of information is not generally considered
4In the model of Liu and Serfes (2006), the two rms sell horizontally and vertically dierentiated
products. Each rm is assumed to have a database with information on consumers who have purchased
her product in the past. The authors analyze the incentives of a rm to directly sell her database to the
competitor.
3to be illegal.
Information sharing between rms may be looked in a suspicious way by antitrust au-
thorities when it somehow leads to coordination between rms. Direct exchanges of infor-
mation about prices, quantities or market shares are commonly forbidden since they are
understood as attempts to facilitate collusion. We study the welfare eects of information
sharing to anticipate whether communication should be allowed by an antitrust authority.
Since demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, a change in prices only corresponds
to a transfer of surplus between consumers and rms. As a result, minimizing the con-
sumers' transportation costs is equivalent to maximizing total surplus. In the presence of
asymmetric information, transportation costs are higher (because the indierent consumer
is not in the middle of the city). Therefore, total surplus is smaller. In this sense, it is
suboptimal to have one rm less informed than the other.
With communication, the rms' joint prots increase. Moreover, consumers support
lower transportation costs. This could give the impression that communication is ben-
ecial both for rms and for consumers. However, we show that the expected value of
consumers' surplus decreases with information exchange. Thus, unless the antitrust au-
thority cares about consumers and producers almost in the same way, she should not allow
for communication between the rms.5
The expected prots of both rms are higher in the case of full information. Therefore,
in the ex-ante stage, both rms are interested in commiting to communicate. However, if
the information is not veriable, the domestic rm will always have the incentive to say
that the transportation costs are high (rendering the message uninformative). The message
may be given credibility if there exists a third party that is able to punish the domestic
rm for giving false information. Alternatively, the contract should provide incentives for
the domestic rm to announce that the transportation costs are low when this is the case.
We determine, in this context, the optimal incentive compatible contract to be oered by
the foreign rm. According to this contract, the foreign rm pays for the information if the
domestic rm reveals that consumers support low costs. However, when the transportation
costs are high, the domestic rm must support a cost to make her announcement credible.
5Assuming that the antitrust authority maximizes a weighted average of the consumers' and the pro-
ducers' expected surplus, we nd that communication should not be allowed if the weight of the consumers'
surplus is higher than 52%.
4Even supporting this cost, the domestic rm may want to disclose her private information,
since she obtains higher net prots than in the case of asymmetric information. For some
values of the parameters there is no incentive compatible contract that both parties are
willing to make.
Our contribution is innovative in several respects. First, by introducing uncertainty
about the degree of product dierentiation in the model of Hotelling. Uncertainty about
the demand has been considered in the huge literature that stems from the seminal con-
tribution of Hotelling. In the works of Harter (1996) and Casado-Izaga (2000), consumers
are assumed to be spread over a subset of unitary length contained in the interval [0;2],
but rms are uncertain about the actual location of the \city".6 In a more recent contri-
bution, Meagher and Zauner (2008) extended the model of Hotelling to the case in which
rms are uncertain about the consumers' spatial distribution. Coastal cities are given as
an example in which rms ignore not only the mean but also the dispersion of the popu-
lation. Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) also incorporate uncertainty in the spatial
competition model. They study competition between two banks that provide nancing to
a continuum of entrepreneurs. In their model, the banks ignore the actual protability
of each entrepreneur's project. Rhee et al. (1992) consider that uncertainty is about the
consumers' preferences. Preferences are assumed to be heterogeneous, having a component
that rms can observe and another that is unobservable. Finally, in the models of Balvers
and Szerb (1996) and of Christou and Vettas (2005), rms sell products that are dierenti-
ated both horizontally and vertically, facing uncertainty about the relative quality of their
products (degree of vertical dierentiation).
The model we present diers from those mentioned above in the way that uncertainty
is introduced. For us, rms perfectly know consumers' preferences, but one of the rms
is uncertain about consumers' transportation costs (degree of horizontal dierentiation).
There are several extensions of Hotelling's model that incorporate asymmetric information.
Private information is commonly assumed to be about the production costs (e.g. Boyer et
al., 2003 and Bester, 1998). To the best of our knowledge, the model we present is pioneer
in introducing asymmetric information about a demand's characteristic.
6In the model of Harter (1996), there are N rms that choose locations sequentially. Afterwads, the
rms that are located inside the city engage in price competition. Casado-Izaga (2000) modies this model
by allowing the rms that locate outside of the city boundaries to get a positive demand.
5Our work is also innovative in addressing issues related to the exchange of information
in a duopoly with horizontal dierentiation. Several works have already studied the con-
sequences and the feasibility of information sharing.7 In the models of Gal-Or (1985), Li
(1985) and Kirby (1988), no information sharing is the unique equilibrium, while Vives
(1990) concluded that the expected total surplus increases with information sharing if the
rms compete in quantities, and thus information sharing should be expected (the opposite
is true if rms compete in prices). Assuming that information is not veriable, Ziv (1993)
studied the incentives for truthful information sharing. His conclusions are similar to ours.
Firms tend to send false information, and, to overcome this problem, they may exchange
transfer payments (rewarding the rm for announcing a \bad" state and penalizing the
rm for claiming that the state is \good").
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 presents the equilibrium both in the case of perfect and of asymmetric information.
Section 4 analyzes the welfare consequences of asymmetric information for rms and for
consumers and the expected benets of information sharing. Section 5 studies information
sharing agreements, both in the case in which rms meet prior to the existence of private
information and in the case in which rms meet already having asymmetric information.
Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs of most propositions.
2 The model
The model we present is based on Hotelling's (1929) model of horizontal dierentiation.
The market is a linear city of unitary length with two rms, 1 and 2, located at the
extremes (x1 = 0 and x2 = 1). The products sold by the rms are identical in all respects
other than the location at which they are sold. Consumers are uniformly distributed on
the line and incur in a transportation cost that is quadratic in distance to buy the product
(d'Aspremont et al., 1979). The utility of a consumer located at x 2 [0;1] that buys
from rm i 2 f1;2g is dened as the dierence between the reservation price for the ideal
7See Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1984, 1990), Fried (1984), Gal-Or (1985,
1986), Li (1985), Sakai (1985, 1986, 1989), Shapiro (1986), Kirby (1988), Sakai and Yamato (1989), Ziv
(1993) and Raith (1996).
6product, V , and the costs of the purchase (price plus the transportation cost):
Ui (x) = V   pi   t(x   xi)
2 :
The reservation price is assumed to be suciently high for the market to be fully covered.
The demand is perfectly inelastic, with each consumer purchasing exactly one unit of the
good. Therefore, the consumers' decision is only from which rm to buy the product.
Suppose that rm 1 (also designated as the domestic rm) operates in her home market,
while rm 2 is a foreign rm. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the rms have
asymmetric information about consumers' characteristics. More precisely, we assume that
such asymmetry only aects the knowledge about consumers' transportation costs. Both
rms know that these costs are quadratic in distance. However, while rm 1 is fully






tH with probability 
tL with probability 1   
; (1)
where tH > tL > 0 and  2 ]0;1[. The extreme cases,  = 0 and  = 1; correspond to the
standard model. If t = 0, the products sold by the rms would not be dierentiated. As it
is well known, in this case the rms sell their products at the marginal cost and have zero
prots.









In the following section, it becomes clear why this assumption is convenient. Essentially, we
impose this additional condition on the parameters to ensure that both rms have positive
demand.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1st stage: Nature chooses t (tH with probability  and tL with probability 1   ). The
domestic rm observes the result.
2nd stage: Firms simultaneously choose prices.
7Without loss of generality, we assume that both rms have zero marginal costs of produc-
tion.8
3 Equilibrium
We start by analyzing the case of perfect information. Then, we introduce asymmetric
information as described above. In both cases, the main goal is to determine the prices set
by each rm and the correspondent prots.
Below, i
k denotes the prot that the rm k obtains in the case of asymmetric infor-
mation, when t = ti. By 
ij
k we denote the prot of rm k, when t = ti and the foreign
rm believes that t = tj, for k 2 f1;2g;i 2 fH;Lg and j 2 fH;Lg.
3.1 Perfect information equilibrium
Suppose that the two rms know that t = ti. In this case, as in the standard model, both
rms are fully informed about t. Therefore, each rm charges ti for her product and the
two rms have equal demand, that is, they equally share the market. Consequently, the








; i 2 fH;Lg :
3.2 Asymmetric information equilibrium
Let us now consider that the rms have asymmetric information about the transportation
cost parameter. Observing the result of nature's choice, tH or tL, the domestic rm can
choose the price, p1H or p1L, that maximizes her prots. The foreign rm, knowing only
the prior distribution of t, has to choose the price, p2, that maximizes her expected prot.
The marginal consumer is the consumer that is indierent between buying the product
from rm 1 or rm 2. The location of such a consumer depends on prices and on t. When
8Otherwise, the equilibrium prices are simply the sum of the marginal costs with the obtained prices.
Thus, the prots remain the same.
8t = tH, the marginal consumer, ~ xH; satises:















If 0  ~ xi  1, for i 2 fH;Lg, the expression for the marginal consumer coincides with the
demand of the domestic rm. The demand of rm 2 is simply 1   ~ xi. When ~ xi = 0, the
rm 2 is the only one selling in the market, while ~ xi = 1 corresponds to the case in which
the rm 1 is monopolistic.
When t = tH; the prots of the domestic rm are:

H

























The uncertainty about t does not allow the foreign rm to anticipate neither the rival's
response function nor her own demand. Such facts make the foreign rm uncertain about
her payo function. Thus, the foreign rm's price seeks to maximize her expected prot:
E2;AI = 
H

































9Hence, the best response function of rm 2 is:10
p2 (p1H;p1L) =
(1   )p1LtH + p1HtL + tHtL
2[(1   )tH + tL]
:
Combining the two rms' best response functions and solving the resulting system, we
obtain the equilibrium prices:
8
> > > > <















Substituting these equilibrium prices in (2) and (3), we nd the expressions for the marginal
consumers:
~ xH =
(1   )tH + (1 + )tL
4[(1   )tH + tL]
and ~ xL =
(2   )tH + tL
4[(1   )tH + tL]
:
It is straightforward to see that, regardless of the parameters of the model (;tH;tL), we
always have 0  ~ xH  1 and ~ xL  0. However, only by imposing Assumption 1 we can
ensure that ~ xL  1.
































tHtL < 0, the second order condition is always veried.















4 Consequences of asymmetric information
Now, we intend to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on the pricing policies,
particularly by comparing the outcomes with asymmetric information to the ones with
perfect information. Moreover, we determine which of these scenarios is more protable
for rms. We end the section by analyzing impacts of asymmetric information on welfare.
Precisely, we determine the consequences of asymmetric information on total surplus and
on consumers' surplus. Finally, we determine the expected eects on welfare of reverting to
perfect information. By doing so, we try to forecast if an antitrust authority (henceforth,
AA) would welcome communication between rms. That is, we attempt to determine
which situation (asymmetric or perfect information) would be desired from the standpoint
of an AA.
4.1 Prices, demand and prots
We start by comparing the prices charged by the rms with and without asymmetric
information.
The transportation cost parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of
dierentiation between the products sold by the two rms. In this sense, the higher the
consumers' transportation cost, the more dierentiated the products are. Then, a higher
value for t increases the market power of rms, softening the price competition. Both rms
are aware of this, of course. However, only the domestic rm observes the actual value of














11That is, when t = tH, the domestic rm can increase her price without losing so much
demand. Then, the domestic rm can set a high price for her product. As the foreign rm
always charges p2, regardless of t, it seems natural to set a lower price than the domestic
rm, when t = tH. The converse is true when t = tL, that is, when the domestic rm
knows that the two products are not very dierentiated.
Recalling that tL and tH are the perfect information prices, the comparison of prices
that follows is not surprising.
Proposition 1. The prices under asymmetric information are such that:
tL < p1L < p2 < p1H < tH:
Using this relation between prices, it is straightforward to see that the two rms never
have equal shares of the market, as it happens in the case of full information.
Corollary 1. When t = tH, the product sold by the foreign rm is the more demanded.
Otherwise, the domestic rm has more demand.
To decide what price to charge, the foreign rm only cares about her expected prot.
However, it is interesting to compare the ex-post prots of both rms, that is, to nd out
which of the rms earns more in the presence of asymmetric information.
Proposition 2. When t = tL, the domestic rm takes advantage of her private informa-


















Curiously, despite being more informed, the domestic rm may not always obtain higher
prots than the rival. For example, if t = tH and tH < 3tL, the foreign rm surely prots
12more than the domestic. One can wonder the reason why to be more informed about
consumers may not always be an advantage. As we saw before, when t = tH, the domestic
rm charges more per unit of product. Charging less for her product, the foreign rm
captures more demand. Thus, the price gain may not be enough to oset the demand loss
faced by the domestic rm. We can conrm this result in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Comparison of the two rms' prof-
its in the presence of asymmetric information.
It also seems interesting to determine which scenario (asymmetric or perfect information)
is more protable for the rms. Let us start by analyzing the case of the domestic rm.













We can now compare the prots of the foreign rm when she ignores the actual value of t
with the prots when she is perfectly informed about t.
Proposition 4. When t = tH, the foreign rm obtains higher prots in the case of perfect

























When the transportation costs are high, the foreign rm always obtains higher prots in
the case of perfect information than in the case of asymmetric information. When t = tL,





for which the foreign rm has higher prots in
the asymmetric information scenario. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Comparison of the foreign rm's
prots with and without asymmetric informa-
tion.
We observe that, when t = tL and   1
2; the foreign rm always prots more in the case
of asymmetric information, regardless of the ratio
tH
tL:
Combining the results in propositions 3 and 4, we conclude that, when t = tH; both
rms would be better o in the case of full information. On the other hand, if t = tL and
  1
2, the two rms benet from the existence of asymmetric information.
144.2 Welfare analysis
4.2.1 Total surplus
The consumers' reservation price is assumed to be suciently high for the market to be
fully covered. As a result, demand is perfectly inelastic: each consumer buys exactly one
unit of the good. For this reason, a change in prices simply corresponds to a transfer of
surplus between consumers and rms.
To study the consequences of asymmetric information on total surplus, we only need,
therefore, to care about the total transportation costs, TC. Given the expression for the
marginal consumer, ~ x; we have:
















To maximize the total surplus is equivalent to nd the minimum of TC. It is easy to check
that TC is minimized when ~ x = 1
2. Using the results in Corollary 1, it follows that:
Corollary 2. If rms have asymmetric information, the total surplus is suboptimal.
4.2.2 Consumers' surplus
Let us now analyze whether the asymmetric information between rms benets or damages
consumers.
Denition 1. The consumers' surplus is dened as:
CS = ~ x(V   p1) + (1   ~ x)(V   p2)   TC(~ x;t) ; (7)
where p1 and p2 are the prices charged by rm 1 and rm 2, respectively.
When t = tL, symmetric information is benecial for consumers: the transportation costs,
TC, are minimal and, furthermore, the prices are lower (tL < p1L < p2). When t = tH,
the eect of asymmetric information on consumers' surplus does not follow immediately.
On the one hand, perfect information leads to the lowest value of TC, which is favorable
to consumers. On the other hand, rms charge higher prices (p2 < p1H < tH), which




SI be the consumers' surplus with asymmetric and with symmetric





AI = V   p2 + ~ xH (p2   p1H)   TC(~ xH;tH)
CSH








































Proposition 5. When t = tL, full information is benecial for consumers. When t = tH,
the converse is true: asymmetric information increases the consumers' surplus.
Therefore, when t = tH, the save in the transportation costs under full information is
not enough to compensate consumers for paying higher prices. In short, the price-eect
dominates, making asymmetric information between rms benecial for consumers.
4.2.3 Expected benets of information sharing
Now we attempt to anticipate the reaction of an antitrust authority (AA) with respect to
communication between rms and the consequent reversion to the perfect information sce-
nario. To know whether it is desirable for consumers, the AA can compare the consumers'
surplus with and without asymmetric information.
In the context of our model, there is no reason for the antitrust authority to be more
informed about t than the foreign rm. Otherwise, she could inform the foreign rm if this
increases the consumers' welfare. For this reason, we assume that the AA only knows the
prior distribution of t.
16Therefore, the AA has no way to know ex-ante if information sharing is or not advanta-
geous for consumers. As seen before, when t = tL, full information increases the consumers'
surplus. On the contrary, when t = tH, consumers would be better o with asymmetric
information. Due to uncertainty, the AA must base her decision on the expected welfare
eect.





















AI are, respectively, the consumers' surplus in the symmetric and
asymmetric information scenarios, when t = ti (i 2 fH;Lg).
We have already determined the expressions for CSH
SI and CSH
AI. Analogously, when





AI = V   p2 + ~ xL (p2   p1L)   TC(~ xL;tL)
CSL









































2 (1   )
(1   )tH + tL
:
As EBC is negative, the expected consumers' surplus is damaged by symmetric information.
This can make the AA reluctant to allow for information sharing between rms. However,
we must have in mind that frequently the main objective of AAs is to maximize a weighted
sum of consumers' surplus and rms' prots.







































2 1   
(1   )tH + tL
: (11)
Note that EBF is always a positive quantity, meaning that the (expected) joint prots
increase with full information.
Let  and 1    be the weights that the antitrust authority gives to EBC and to
EBF; respectively. The AA should allow for homogenization of information, if EBC +
(1   )EBF is positive. Substituting (9) and (11) on this weighted sum:




2 (1   )
(1   )tH + tL
(14   27);





As a result, the decision of an antitrust authority that cares about consumers and rms
depends on the weight she gives to each component.
5 Exchange of information
Foreign rms commonly obtain information through agencies or through market researches.
Here, we consider the domestic rm as a possible source of information: the foreign rm
directly asks her competitor for information about t.
According to Vives (2006), \in general, antitrust authorities, including the European
Commission, look with suspicion at information exchanges of individual rms' data, prices
and quantities in particular, because they may help monitoring deviations from collusive
agreements". However, the information exchange between rms is not always considered
to be illegal. Moreover, it is not always clear for the AAs whether they should or not forbid
information sharing.
18In this section, we obtain the value of the information about t for the foreign rm. We
show that if she oers this (xed) amount in exchange for the information, the domestic
rm always has incentives to announce that t = tH.
Finally, we determine the contract that the foreign rm should propose for the rival to
truthfully disclose her information.
5.1 Veriable information
Consider the case in which the two rms have the possibility of communicating at the
beginning of the game, that is, even before the domestic rm observes the value of t. We
are interested in knowing if: (i) the domestic rm ex-ante is willing to commit herself to
disclose her future information; (ii) the foreign rm is interested in such commitment.
We dene the value of the information about t for the foreign rm, 
2, as the dierence
between her expected prots with information and without it. In the case of perfect
information, the expected prot of the foreign rm is:
E2;SI = 
HH









We have already determined, in (5), the expected prots of the foreign rm in the case of
asymmetric information, E2;AI. Hence, the value of information for the foreign rm is:

2 = E2;SI   E2;AI = 
tH
2












2 1   
(1   )tH + tL
: (12)
The ex-ante gain (or loss) for the domestic rm that results from information sharing, 
1,
can be calculated (similarly) as the expected increase in prots:
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(1   )tH + tL
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2 1   
(1   )tH + tL
:
19The domestic rm also gains, ex-ante, with information sharing. Therefore, there will
be information sharing. Recall that: if t = tL, the domestic rm prefers not to share
her information; while if t = tH, the domestic rm prots more in the case of perfect
information and, therefore, is willing to share her information. A diculty is that these
two choices are incompatible. If communication is possible, absence of communication is
interpreted by the foreign rm as a signal that t = tL. The domestic rm is not able to
avoid revealing the true value of t.
So far, the possibility of a false information disclosure was ignored. That is, we as-
sumed that the information is veriable. The domestic rm was not able to lie about the
magnitude of the transportation costs. This is a common assumption in the literature
(Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) and Gal-Or (1985)). In this case, facing a false disclosure,
the foreign rm can complain in a court of law to punish the rival.
Another possibility is to assume the existence of a trade association that implements
truthful communication. Both rms have to decide whether or not to join such institution
before the domestic rm observes the value of t. The rms must fund this institution by
paying a fee. In this case, 
1 and 
2 could be the fees paid by the domestic rm and the
foreign rm, respectively. This institution could operate like this: (i) each rm pays her
fee; (ii) after observing the value of t, the domestic rm reveals it to the institution, which,
in turn, makes it available to the foreign rm; (iii) rms choose prices. After realizing
her demand, the foreign rm detects if the message she received was true or false. To
enforce truth-telling, we can consider that, in the case of a false report, the foreign rm
can complain to the institution. In this case, the institution carries a market research to
nd out if the accusation is or not fair. If the domestic rm had, in fact, lied about t, the
institution compensates the foreign rm by giving her fee back.
5.2 Unveriable information
Now suppose that the information is not veriable and that the domestic rm is not
penalized ex-post if she lies about the value of t.
Proposition 6. If the foreign rm believes in the message she receives, the domestic rm
will always have the incentive to tell that t = tH, regardless of its true value.
20Thus, if the domestic rm can send the message she prefers without a punishment, she
does not represent a reliable source of information. The rm has the incentive to lie when
t = tL, to induce the foreign rm to charge a higher price (believing in the message, the
foreign rm charges tH instead of tL). As a result, the domestic rm can herself set a
higher price, p1L (tH) > tL, achieving higher prots than if she had told the truth.
To induce truthful communication in the case of unveriable information, the foreign
rm must oer an incentive compatible contract to her rival.
When the foreign rm proposes a contract to the domestic rm, she can receive one of
the following messages:
 m = m0 - the contract is rejected;
 m = mH - the contract is accepted and the message is t = tH;
 m = mL - the contract is accepted and the message is t = tL.
If the domestic rm rejects the contract (i.e. sends the message m = m0), there is no
monetary transfer. Thus, to dene the contract, we only need to determine the pair of
transfers, (
H;
L), from the foreign rm to the domestic rm when m = mH and m = mL,
respectively.
By observing the domestic rm's response, the foreign rm can update her beliefs about
t = tH. We denote these posterior beliefs as (mi), i 2 f0;H;Lg, where mi is the message






tH with probability (mi)
tL with probability 1   (mi)
:
The revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) allows us to restrict the attention to direct mech-
anisms involving truthful revelation.
Denition 2. A pair (
H;




















21subject to the constraints:
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The participation constraints, (PCH) and (PCL), imply that the domestic rm accepts the
contract. The incentive compatible constraints, (ICCH) and (ICCL), ensure that, once
the contract is accepted, the information revealed is true. Hence, the foreign rm updates
her prior beliefs so that: (mL) = 0 and (mH) = 1. Determining the optimal contract
also requires an assumption on how the foreign rm revises her beliefs about t = tH, when
receiving the message m = m0. In this case, we will suppose that the rm does not revise
her beliefs: that is, she keeps assuming that t follows the prior distribution, given in (1).
This conjecture, so-called \passive beliefs", simplies the analysis and it is widely used in
the literature (Rey and Verg e, 2004; Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).








With this assumption, we can rewrite (14) as:
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It can be shown that the binding constraints are (ICCL) and (PCH).























































[(1   )tH + tL]
2:
The optimal contract demands the domestic rm to share part of her prots with the com-
petitor, when t = tH.11 This is the only way domestic rm has to make the announcement
t = tH credible. As proved in Proposition 6, the she has incentives to convince her com-
petitor that t = tH. Thus, to be a reliable source of information, the domestic rm has to
support a cost, when revealing that t = tH. The same occurs in the model of Ziv (1993),
who also allows a rm to make a \direct payment [...] to its competitor when it sends
a message". Concerning the realism of such mechanisms, the author argues that: \it is
not unusual to see very complicated transactions that may occur in order to hide an illegal
transaction between two rms. Simplifying these transactions may show that the rms are
just transferring information through such payments."
Recall that p2 < tH; that is, when the transportation costs are high, the foreign rm
charges more for her product if she is informed about t. In this case, the domestic rm gains
by disclosing her private information, since the rival sets a higher price (allowing herself to
practice a higher price too, as p1H < tH). This contract ensures that the \signaling cost"
of announcing that t = tH does not exceed the benets of perfect information.




L), we can fear a false report when t = tH: The





H. However, the constraint (ICCL) guarantees that this does not happen.
11With slight modications, 

H could also be interpreted as advertisement spendings or charity expenses





L) ensures the foreign rm that the domestic rm will always tell
the truth. However, when t = tL; the contract can be so costly for the foreign rm that she











































Hence, the contract (17) is proposed if and only if the resulting expected prot, E2;C, is
higher than the expected prot of the foreign rm if she is uncertain about t, E2;AI.









6   1 +
p
1   12 + 642

:





for which it is protable (at least in expected values)
for the foreign rm to propose the optimal contract are plotted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Willingness of the foreign rm in
proposing the contract (17) to the rival.
In particular, we concluded that the foreign rm does not propose the contract (17) if
the probability of high consumers' transportation costs, , is smaller than 2
9. Moreover,
a higher value for  makes the foreign rm more willing to propose the contract. This
conclusion is not surprising, since the higher is , the higher is the probability of receiving






There are several markets in which domestic rms have an informational advantage when
competing with foreign rms. Motivated by this, we analyzed the impacts of asymmetric
information about consumers' transportation costs in Hotelling's model. More precisely,
we studied the eects on prices, prots and consumers' welfare. We also suggested that a
foreign rm could acquire information from a domestic rival. Finally, we anticipated the
probable decision of an antitrust authority on allowing or not this type of communication
between the rms.
We found that the prices under asymmetric information never coincide with the prices
charged when both rms have full information. More precisely, when the transportation
costs are low (high), the foreign rm sets a higher (lower) price than the rival. As result,
when the transportation costs are low (high), the domestic rm sells more (less).
In order to evaluate the impacts of asymmetric information on prots, we compared the
earnings of the domestic rm with those of her rival. When the transportation costs are
low, the domestic rm takes advantage of her private information, achieving higher prots
than the rival. However, the domestic rm does not always earn more than the foreign
rm. For instance, if consumers support high transportation costs and the ratio between
high and low transportation costs is smaller than three, the foreign rm obtains higher
prots.
We also compared the rms' prots under asymmetric information with those with
full information. We noticed that, if the transportation costs are low, the existence of
uncertainty can allow the rms to obtain higher prots than in the case of full information.
However, when transportation costs are high, asymmetric information hurts the prots of
both rms.
To appraise the willingness of the foreign rm in acquiring the information, we deter-
mined the value of this information for her. We remarked that if the foreign rm oered
this amount to the rival in exchange for her information, the domestic rm will always wish
to tell that consumers support high transportation costs. Unless there is an external agency
involved or the data is veriable, the domestic rm does not represent a credible source of
information. Motivated by this, we designed an incentive compatible contract to be pro-
posed by the foreign rm, in which the information is always truthfully disclosed. In such
25a contract, the foreign rm pays for the information when the domestic rm reveals that
the transportation costs are low. If the domestic rm announces that the transportation
costs are high, she has to incur in costs to make the message credible.
In addition, we analyzed the welfare consequences of communication between rms.
Full information yields a Pareto-optimal outcome, with each rm capturing half of the
market. Thus, from the social viewpoint, the communication between rms provides an
improvement in welfare. In order to isolate the welfare eects of the information sharing
on each side of the market, we studied its impacts on the expected consumers' surplus and
on expected rms' prots. When consumers pay low transportation costs, the information
sharing is benecial for them, since they pay less for the product. On the contrary, when the
transportation costs are high, their surplus is damaged by communication between rms.
Although increasing the expected total surplus, communication between the rms decreases
the expected consumers' surplus. That is, rms capture all the increase in social surplus
that results from the exchange of information and still extract part of the consumers'
surplus. Thus, the communication between the rms can severely damage the consumers.
Consequently, an antitrust authority must weight these pros (increase in prots and total
surplus) and cons (decrease in consumers' surplus) of allowing information sharing between
rival rms.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Using the expressions for prices with asymmetric information already determined in (4):
p1H < tH ,
tH
2
(1   )tH + (1 + )tL
(1   )tH + tL
< tH , tH > tL
and
p1L > tL ,
tL
2
(2   )tH + tL
(1   )tH + tL
> tL , tH > tL:
26Moreover,
p1H > p1L ,
tH
2
(1   )tH + (1 + )tL




(2   )tH + tL
(1   )tH + tL
, (tH   tL)[(1   )tH + tL] > 0:
Comparing the prices charged by each rm when t = tH; we obtain:
p1H > p2 ,
tH
2
(1   )tH + (1 + )tL
(1   )tH + tL
>
tHtL
(1   )tH + tL
, tH > tL:
When t = tL; the condition
p2 > p1L ,
tHtL




(2   )tH + tL
(1   )tH + tL
, tH > tL
is always veried. 
Proof of Corollary 1
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, (tH   tL)(   1) < 0 :
If t = tL, the opposite is true, since ~ xL > 1
2 is equivalent to the universal condition:
(2   )tH + tL




, (tH   tL) > 0 : 
Proof of Proposition 2
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Proof of Proposition 3
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which is always true. The inequality L
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Proof of Proposition 4
The condition H
2  HH
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2
, (tH   tL)(1   )(tL   2tH + 2tH   2tL)  0 :
28As tH > tL and  2 (0;1), the inequality above is equivalent to:
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The inequality above is equivalent to:
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Proof of Proposition 5
When t = tL, the symmetric information is benecial for consumers since rms charge
a lower price and, as ~ x = 1
2, the total transportation costs are lower. When t = tH,
12Recall that the assumption (1) must also be veried.
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which is always true. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that t = tL: If the domestic rm announces that t = tH, the foreign rm sets
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which is always true. When t = tH but the foreign rm takes tL as been the true value for
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Proof of Proposition 7
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H is trivially non positive. 
Proof of Proposition 8
The foreign rm proposes the contract (17) to the rival if:
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;
which is equivalent (substituting the expressions for prots) to:
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The roots of (1   )
2 t2









6   1  
p





6   1 +
p
1   12 + 642 :










\ ]tL;+1[ is non empty if:




6   1 +
p

















inequality is equivalent to:
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